# Notes/Explanation

This is the first wave of negative materials for the Taiwan Grand Bargain Affirmative. When debating this case, students should also make use of the relevant materials from the starter packet (especially as it relates to U.S.-China relations).

# Off-Case

## Deterrence DA

### 1NC — Deterrence DA

#### First/next off is the Deterrence DA.

#### First, the U.S. will maintain its hegemony in the Asia-Pacific *unless* it abandons Taiwan.

Roy 12 — Denny Roy, Senior Fellow and Supervisor of the POSCO Fellowship Program at the East-West Center—a U.S.-based institution for public diplomacy in the Asia Pacific region, former Professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, former Faculty Member in the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval Postgraduate School, former Research Fellow with the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University in Canberra, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago, 2012 (“Why the U.S. shouldn't abandon Taiwan,” *Time*, December 6th, Available Online at http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/12/06/why-the-u-s-shouldnt-abandon-taiwan/, Accessed 06-28-2016)

Many observers see America in permanent decline and China as the anointed regional hegemon, but both of these outcomes are highly uncertain. Although now in the trough of an unemployment and fiscal crisis, the United States will probably recover. Conversely, China faces serious limits to its bid for regional leadership. These include internal vulnerabilities such as an aging population, the potential for large-scale political turmoil caused by groups angry at the Chinese government, and the necessity of making huge and painful adjustments to the Chinese economy.

Externally, few states in Asia prefer Chinese to U.S. leadership. Unless China becomes overwhelmingly strong and American capabilities greatly diminish, security cooperation among the Asia-Pacific countries in defense of widely-accepted norms of international behavior will be sufficient to check those Chinese aspirations that are illegitimate in that they forcibly intrude on other people’s vital interests.

One of these illegitimate aspirations is the notion that China cannot be a prosperous, secure great power without politically absorbing Taiwan, the last big piece of unfinished business from China’s “century of humiliation.” Abandoning Taiwan would, tragically, acquiesce to this notion. The threat of Taiwan independence is an unfortunate invention of the Chinese Communist Party. It is a fake threat. An autonomous Taiwan is not preventing massive increases in China’s prosperity and security. On the other hand, Beijing’s threat to militarily destroy the political system and political identity chosen by Taiwan’s people is real.

Abandoning Taiwan is completely at odds with the broad U.S. agenda for international affairs as well as with the specific policy of “re-balancing” toward Asia. Washington should consider cutting off its support to Taiwan only if the United States has decided to abdicate its leadership role in the Asia-Pacific region and pull its influence back to the Western Hemisphere.

#### Second, the plan increases the risk of nuclear war — it emboldens China, destroys the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and crushes U.S. hegemony in Asia.

Lee 11 — Shyu-Tu Lee, President of the North America Taiwanese Professors' Association, 2011 (“Disengaging From Taiwan,” *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 90, Issue 4, July/August, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Academic Search Elite)

According to Charles Glaser, the prospects for avoiding war between the United States and China are good ("Will China's Rise Lead to War?" March/April 2011). But by ignoring China's history and economic policy and other relevant factors, Glaser arrives at policy prescriptions that would increase the chance of a Chinese nuclear attack on the U.S. homeland.

Glaser misjudges Chinese motives. China's military modernization is not primarily motivated by insecurity, as he asserts. China is not threatened by the United States or any of its neighbors. It is advocating its model of governance—managed capitalism combined with one-party authoritarianism—as a more efficient alternative to a free-market economy and democracy. China's mission is to regain its place as the dominant superpower so that the country can cleanse itself of the humiliation it has experienced at the hands of the West.

The rise of China poses grave challenges to U.S. security. Beijing implements a mercantilist trade policy and artificially sets a low value on its currency to promote exports, thus creating a large U.S. trade deficit with China year after year. Its army has been modernizing at a rapid pace, developing anti-access, area-denial weapons and cyber- and space-warfare capabilities. Meanwhile, China wants to integrate Taiwan because its democracy threatens Beijing's autocratic and repressive rule. In addition, Beijing needs Taiwan as a military base from which to project power into the Indian and Pacific oceans.

To keep the peace, the United States must discard the culture of excessive deference to Beijing and implement policies to maintain U.S. military superiority, stanch the flow of U.S. wealth to China, steer China toward democratization, strengthen its alliances with Japan and South Korea, and engage China in an economic and strategic dialogue to promote fair trade and avoid misunderstandings.

To prevent a crisis from escalating to nuclear war, Glaser says that the United States should back away from its commitment to Taiwan. Such accommodation, he argues, would smooth the way for better relations with China in the decades to come. Yet if Taiwan were to fall, the United States would suffer a geostrategic disaster. The sea-lanes and airspace around Taiwan are critical to the survival of Japan and South Korea. Once in control of Taiwan, China could turn Japan and South Korea into vassal states. With the demise of the U.S.-Japanese military alliance, the United States would be forced to retreat to Hawaii.

#### Third, this sparks global arms races and nuclear proliferation.

Cole 15 — J. Michael Cole, Associate Researcher at the French Centre for Research on Contemporary China, Senior Non-Resident Fellow at the China Policy Institute at the University of Nottingham, China Correspondent for *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Senior Member and Editor in Chief at the Thinking Taiwan Foundation—a Taiwanese English-language publication founded by current Taiwanese President Dr. Tsai Ing-wen that provides nonpartisan analysis and commentary, former Deputy News Chief and Reporter for the *Taipei Times*, former Analyst with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, holds a Master’s in War Studies from the Royal Military College of Canada, 2015 (“If the Unthinkable Occurred: America Should Stand Up to China over Taiwan,” *The National Interest*, May 7th, Available Online at http://nationalinterest.org/feature/if-the-unthinkable-occured-america-should-stand-china-over-12825?page=show, Accessed 06-30-2016)

White’s realism isn’t a solution; it’s a recipe for chaos. By accumulating enough comprehensive national power, and by crossing the nuclear threshold, states would have free rein to make irredentist or expansionist territorial claims on weaker states, a return to the scorpions-filled bottle pre–World War I, only this time the critters are bristling with nuclear weapons. Not only would this invite aggression by powerful states, it would create incentives for acquiring nuclear weapons and thereby bury existing nonproliferation regimes, not to mention spark arms races all over the planet. If force is the only determinant of international politics, this is the only foreseeable outcome. Moreover, how much comprehensive power would a state assume is necessary in order to get away with aggression? How many nuclear warheads? Rather than bring stability, White’s world would encourage miscalculation.

#### Finally, proliferation causes nuclear war — turns the case.

Utgoff 2 — Victor A. Utgoff, Deputy Director of the Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of the Institute for Defense Analyses and senior member of the National Security Council Staff, 2002 (“Proliferation, Missile Defence And American Ambitions,” *Survival*, Volume 44, Number 2, June, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via EBSCOhost Electronic Journals Service, p. 87-90)

In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear 'six-shooters' on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations.

### Alliance/Hegemony Module

#### The plan destroys U.S. alliances and crushes U.S. leadership.

Roy 12 — Denny Roy, Senior Fellow and Supervisor of the POSCO Fellowship Program at the East-West Center—a U.S.-based institution for public diplomacy in the Asia Pacific region, former Professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, former Faculty Member in the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval Postgraduate School, former Research Fellow with the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University in Canberra, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago, 2012 (“Why the U.S. shouldn't abandon Taiwan,” *Time*, December 6th, Available Online at http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/12/06/why-the-u-s-shouldnt-abandon-taiwan/, Accessed 06-28-2016)

Absorption of Taiwan by China would make Taiwan an “unsinkable aircraft carrier” for the Chinese military. Taiwan anchors the “first island chain,” limiting the Chinese Navy’s access to the Pacific Ocean. Conversely, occupation of Taiwan would allow Chinese forces to straddle important sea lanes that are the economic lifelines of Japan and South Korea. Chinese control of Taiwan would greatly increase the pressure on Tokyo and Seoul, critically important U.S. allies, to accommodate Beijing’s strategic wishes. These alliances, and along with them the U.S. leadership role in the western Pacific, might become untenable.

#### This causes an arms race that *increases* the risk of nuclear escalation — turns the case.

Cole 11 — J. Michael Cole, Associate Researcher at the French Centre for Research on Contemporary China, Senior Non-Resident Fellow at the China Policy Institute at the University of Nottingham, China Correspondent for *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Senior Member and Editor in Chief at the Thinking Taiwan Foundation—a Taiwanese English-language publication founded by current Taiwanese President Dr. Tsai Ing-wen that provides nonpartisan analysis and commentary, former Deputy News Chief and Reporter for the *Taipei Times*, former Analyst with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, holds a Master’s in War Studies from the Royal Military College of Canada, 2011 (“Realism does not mean inhumanity,” *Taipei Times*, March 4th, Available Online at http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/print/2011/03/04/2003497298, Accessed 06-30-2016)

One thing Glaser’s article does not address is how other regional powers, such as Japan and India, would react to China suddenly extending its line of control and threatening the first island chain and beyond. As Robert Kaplan writes in his most recent book, Monsoon, “China wants desperately to integrate Taiwan into its dominion, so that it can redirect its naval energies to the Indian Ocean” and thereby escape from the Strait of Malacca dilemma.

Here, as in the 1940s Europe from our alternate scenario, the likeliest outcome would be an arms race, perhaps even the entry of Japan as a nuclear power. From then on, any future conflict — now region-wide — would risk being even more devastating.

#### Perception alone is enough to destroy U.S. alliances.

Roy 12 — Denny Roy, Senior Fellow and Supervisor of the POSCO Fellowship Program at the East-West Center—a U.S.-based institution for public diplomacy in the Asia Pacific region, former Professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, former Faculty Member in the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval Postgraduate School, former Research Fellow with the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University in Canberra, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago, 2012 (“Why the U.S. shouldn't abandon Taiwan,” *Time*, December 6th, Available Online at http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/12/06/why-the-u-s-shouldnt-abandon-taiwan/, Accessed 06-28-2016)

Some countries in the region are willing to stand up for their own interests against Chinese encroachment only if they have confidence in a long-term U.S. commitment to be a security partner. Other Asia-Pacific governments friendly to the United States would certainly take note if Washington sacrificed Taiwan to improve relations with China. Not only would the U.S. reputation for reliability suffer, but regional governments would perceive a shift in regional leadership from America to China.

#### The signal of the plan freaks out allies — they’ll ramp up their defenses.

Cole 15 — J. Michael Cole, Associate Researcher at the French Centre for Research on Contemporary China, Senior Non-Resident Fellow at the China Policy Institute at the University of Nottingham, China Correspondent for *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Senior Member and Editor in Chief at the Thinking Taiwan Foundation—a Taiwanese English-language publication founded by current Taiwanese President Dr. Tsai Ing-wen that provides nonpartisan analysis and commentary, former Deputy News Chief and Reporter for the *Taipei Times*, former Analyst with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, holds a Master’s in War Studies from the Royal Military College of Canada, 2015 (“If the Unthinkable Occurred: America Should Stand Up to China over Taiwan,” *The National Interest*, May 7th, Available Online at http://nationalinterest.org/feature/if-the-unthinkable-occured-america-should-stand-china-over-12825?page=show, Accessed 06-30-2016)

Abandoning Taiwan to its inevitable fate due to China’s strength (and nuclear blackmail) would also undermine existing security alliances and discredit the agreements, legal and tacit, that have helped maintain peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific over the decades. Such signaling would in turn encourage states in China’s neighborhood to do the necessary to protect themselves should the day come when they, too, are left to fend for themselves. It would indicate that good behavior and peaceful democratization—two qualities that apply to Taiwan—are of no intrinsic value to mankind and therefore not worth defending. And it would also prove that even medium powers (with a population of 23 million people and the world’s nineteenth-largest economy, Taiwan is not exactly a gnat) are not immune to the desires of greater powers.

### Chinese Expansionism Module

#### The DA turns the case — the plan accelerates Chinese expansionism and *increases* the risk of war.

Cole 15 — J. Michael Cole, Associate Researcher at the French Centre for Research on Contemporary China, Senior Non-Resident Fellow at the China Policy Institute at the University of Nottingham, China Correspondent for *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Senior Member and Editor in Chief at the Thinking Taiwan Foundation—a Taiwanese English-language publication founded by current Taiwanese President Dr. Tsai Ing-wen that provides nonpartisan analysis and commentary, former Deputy News Chief and Reporter for the *Taipei Times*, former Analyst with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, holds a Master’s in War Studies from the Royal Military College of Canada, 2015 (“Don't Let China Swallow Taiwan,” *The National Interest*, April 23rd, Available Online at <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/dont-let-china-swallow-taiwan-12708?page=show>, Accessed 06-28-2016)

With the prospects of a transition of power next year, the punditry is once again shifting into high gear with alarmist messages about the risk of renewed tensions in the Taiwan Strait. As always, it is the Taiwanese side—not only the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) but also the millions of Taiwanese who want to maintain their way of life—that is being blamed for the potential risks, not the bully on the other side who is aiming his canons at the island.

What is even more extraordinary about this lopsided logic is that its adherents do recognize the extraordinary accomplishments that have been made by Taiwan over the decades. And yet they still find it within themselves to propose policies that are as defeatist as they are bereft of human decency—or logic, for that matter, as we shall see.

One of the high priests of the abandonment strategy is Hugh White, professor of strategic studies at the Australian National University in Canberra. Every once in a while, White regurgitates that point in op-eds and speeches (he tiptoed around the issue during a talk in Taipei last year, which I attended).

The gist of his idea is that China’s national power has become such that Taiwan cannot hope to resist it and the international community, the United States included, will not intervene on its behalf, lest doing so spark a major conflagration in the Asia-Pacific and hurt their economies.

In an op-ed, titled “The harsh reality that Taiwan faces” published in the Straits Times on April 15, White spells it all out. “Taiwan and its friends and admirers everywhere have to think very carefully about how to handle the dangerous period that lies ahead and to consider what is ultimately in the best interest of the Taiwanese people, as well as the rest of us.”

“The conclusions,” he writes, “will be uncomfortable, but inescapable.” In other words, White argues that Taiwan’s capitulation, and abandonment by the international community, is the only option.

The problem with White’s über-Realist position is that it rests on a series of false assumptions about China. To be fair to White, he doesn’t get it all wrong. He correctly identifies Beijing’s impatience under Xi Jinping and is almost certainly right when he says that a future DPP or Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) leader would not “return to policies as provocative to China as those of Mr. Lee or Mr. Chen”—referring to former presidents Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian—but that he or she would likely be more assertive than President Ma Ying-jeou, whose policy over the past seven years has primarily been to bend over backwards to please Beijing. (The so-called greater assertiveness of the future leader will be nothing more than a reflection of popular expectations in democratic Taiwan.)

However, White fails in his prescriptions, however laudable his intention to avoid major escalations may be. He writes:

No one visiting Taipei can fail to be impressed by what the Taiwanese have achieved in recent decades, not just economically but also politically, socially and culturally. But the harsh reality is that no country is going to sacrifice its relations with China in order to help Taiwan preserve the status quo. China is simply too important economically, and too powerful militarily, for anyone to confront it on Taiwan’s behalf, especially when everyone knows how determined China is to achieve reunification eventually.

The argument that a regional hegemon has become so powerful that smaller parties shouldn’t resist it and are undeserving of international support is a recipe for disaster, as it presages a return to an international relations system that led to two world wars.

We all know what good it did the world when the great powers left Czechoslovakia to fend for itself against Nazi Germany. The idea here isn’t to compare Beijing to Berlin under Hitler, but simply to point out the internal logic and dynamics of expansionism, and how appeasement isn’t the best answer to it.

Giving Taiwan away (as if it were the international community’s to give away to start with) would be akin to a sacrificial ceremony to appease an angry god. The problem is that doing so would likely be interpreted by Beijing as a sign of weakness, which almost certainly would fan the flames of Chinese expansionism rather than extinguish them. In fact, the annexation of Taiwan would further contribute to China’s might by adding the world’s 19th largest economy to its national power while providing Beijing with an “unsinkable carrier” facing an open Western Pacific. In this sense, it would provide China with a new front from which to confront Japan and the Philippines, not to mention U.S. forces deployed in the region.

Arguing for the preservation of Taiwan isn’t simply a symptom of wishful thinking by naïve liberals who want to save a democracy against authoritarianism; the Realists’ point that it should be bargained away can be met on similar terms. Abandoning Taiwan would likely encourage Chinese expansionism while giving it more tools to do so. In other words, the tradeoff, rather than ease tensions, would risk much greater instability in future.

#### Control of Taiwan would significantly strengthen the PLA — Glaser is wrong.

Roy 15 — Denny Roy, Senior Fellow and Supervisor of the POSCO Fellowship Program at the East-West Center—a U.S.-based institution for public diplomacy in the Asia Pacific region, former Professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, former Faculty Member in the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval Postgraduate School, former Research Fellow with the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University in Canberra, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago, 2015 (“The Impossible Price of a U.S.-China Grand Bargain: Dumping Taiwan,” *The National Interest*, June 24th, Available Online at <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-impossible-price-us-china-grand-bargain-dumping-taiwan-13177?page=show>, Accessed 06-28-2016)

On the subject of Taiwan’s strategic value, Glaser spends most of his effort arguing against his own thesis. He points out that Taiwan acts as a huge barrier, creating choke points for the deployment of PLA naval forces, while possession of Taiwan would give the PLAN direct access to the deeper waters of the Pacific, would increase the Chinese A2/AD capability, would extend the range of air cover for the Chinese navy, and particularly would make it easy for Chinese submarines to enter the Philippine Sea and threaten US carrier battle groups there. Having made these points, Glaser unconvincingly concludes that controlling Taiwan would not “significantly increase” Chinese military leverage.

#### Chinese control of Taiwan would change the strategic calculations of Japan and South Korea — they’d be forced into an escalatory arms race.

Holmes and Yoshihara 11 — James Holmes, Associate Professor of Strategy at the U.S. Naval War College, former Senior Research Associate at the Universit of Georgia and Research Associate at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, formerly served as a Surface Warfare Officer in the United States Navy, holds a Ph.D. in International Security Studies and Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy from Tufts University, and Toshi Yoshihara Associate Professor of Strategy and John A. van Beuren Chair of Asia-Pacific Studies at the U.S. Naval War College, former Research Fellow at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, holds a Ph.D. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, 2011 (“Getting Real About Taiwan,” *The Diplomat*, March 7th, Available Online at <http://thediplomat.com/2011/03/getting-real-about-taiwan/?allpages=yes>, Accessed 06-30-2016)

During World War II, Adm. Ernest King aptly portrayed Formosa as the ‘cork’ in the ‘bottle’ of the South China Sea—as a base from which naval and air forces could seal off imperial Japan’s Southern Resource Area. Similarly, Taiwan has long served as a literal and figurative cork in China’s bottle, riveting Beijing’s attention on the cross-strait stalemate while complicating north-south movement along the Asian seaboard and access to the Western Pacific.

Uncorking the bottle would, in effect, free up resources for China to pursue broader regional aims. For example, Japan and South Korea would feel the effects once Beijing stationed naval and air forces on the island, turning their southern flank and imposing control of adjacent seas and skies. All Northeast Asian nations depend on the seas to convey imports and exports to and from their seaports. As we can infer from Adm. King’s words, absolute control of China’s economic lifelines equates to a stranglehold over the maritime-dependent Japanese and Korean economies. This fact isn’t lost on Chinese strategists. In this brave new world, Tokyo and Seoul would find little solace in US nuclear guarantees or assurances of future support, and would have little choice but to provide for their own defence. The modest arms race already underway would accelerate.

#### Signs of weakness embolden China — the perception of the plan *alone* is enough.

Cole 12 — J. Michael Cole, Associate Researcher at the French Centre for Research on Contemporary China, Senior Non-Resident Fellow at the China Policy Institute at the University of Nottingham, China Correspondent for *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Senior Member and Editor in Chief at the Thinking Taiwan Foundation—a Taiwanese English-language publication founded by current Taiwanese President Dr. Tsai Ing-wen that provides nonpartisan analysis and commentary, former Deputy News Chief and Reporter for the *Taipei Times*, former Analyst with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, holds a Master’s in War Studies from the Royal Military College of Canada, 2012 (“Time To End U.S. 'Ambiguity' on Taiwan,” *The Diplomat*, July 6th, Available Online at http://thediplomat.com/2012/07/time-to-end-u-s-ambiguity-on-taiwan/, Accessed 06-28-2016)

While the Obama administration, breaking the precedent set by previous administrations, took a conciliatory approach to China when it entered office, it has since realized that Beijing does not intend to play by the rules and remains, despite wishes to the contrary, an irresponsible stakeholder on several important issues.

War over Taiwan is not inevitable, but signs of weakness or disinterest on Washington’s part could make that option more attractive to Beijing, especially when its efforts to achieve unification by “peaceful” means run into difficulties, as they most certainly will.

#### History proves that rising powers are never satisfied by territorial acquisitions.

Holmes and Yoshihara 11 — James Holmes, Associate Professor of Strategy at the U.S. Naval War College, former Senior Research Associate at the Universit of Georgia and Research Associate at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, formerly served as a Surface Warfare Officer in the United States Navy, holds a Ph.D. in International Security Studies and Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy from Tufts University, and Toshi Yoshihara Associate Professor of Strategy and John A. van Beuren Chair of Asia-Pacific Studies at the U.S. Naval War College, former Research Fellow at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, holds a Ph.D. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, 2011 (“Getting Real About Taiwan,” *The Diplomat*, March 7th, Available Online at <http://thediplomat.com/2011/03/getting-real-about-taiwan/?allpages=yes>, Accessed 06-30-2016)

And finally, the fact is that history amply demonstrates that new territorial acquisitions encourage statesmen to seek forward defences for their valuable new holdings. The quest for a defensive buffer for India, the jewel in the crown of the British Empire, drove British policy in Central Asia during the ‘Great Game’ with imperial Russia. And after its triumph in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, Tokyo almost instantly set out to mount a forward defence of Korea, its principal gain from the conflict. Japanese pursuit of security on the Asian mainland ultimately led Tokyo to invade first Manchuria, then China proper.

To be sure, obtaining the Korean Peninsula and the southern half of Sakhalin Island in the peace settlement satiated perceived Japanese security needs and steadied the regional balance of power—briefly. But the ensuing strategic equilibrium bought Britain and the United States too little time to respond adequately to Japan’s eventual, forcible reordering of the Asian hierarchy. British leaders had struck up an alliance with Tokyo in 1902 in hopes that Japan would become a responsible stakeholder in its own backyard—managing East Asian affairs while permitting Britain to withdraw its fleet to tend to the growing, and more pressing, rivalry with Imperial Germany and its High Seas Fleet. This ‘realist’ calculus shattered during the opening phases of the Pacific War, when Japanese forces launched a blitzkrieg that dismantled the British Empire’s Far East holdings. Ambitious great powers tend to devour territorial concessions as appetizers—not dessert.

### They Say: “Plan Prevents Chinese Expansionism”

#### The plan creates a vicious cycle of expansionism that undermines regional stability — China won’t be satisfied by the plan.

Cole 15 — J. Michael Cole, Associate Researcher at the French Centre for Research on Contemporary China, Senior Non-Resident Fellow at the China Policy Institute at the University of Nottingham, China Correspondent for *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Senior Member and Editor in Chief at the Thinking Taiwan Foundation—a Taiwanese English-language publication founded by current Taiwanese President Dr. Tsai Ing-wen that provides nonpartisan analysis and commentary, former Deputy News Chief and Reporter for the *Taipei Times*, former Analyst with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, holds a Master’s in War Studies from the Royal Military College of Canada, 2015 (“If the Unthinkable Occurred: America Should Stand Up to China over Taiwan,” *The National Interest*, May 7th, Available Online at http://nationalinterest.org/feature/if-the-unthinkable-occured-america-should-stand-china-over-12825?page=show, Accessed 06-30-2016)

Lastly, as I pointed out in my previous piece, there is absolutely no guarantee that after acquiring Taiwan (on a silver platter or at the end of a rifle), China’s appetite would be sated. In fact, much like imperialism, territorial expansionism has its own internal dynamics: the more territory one controls, the greater the incentive to push outwards to protect newly acquired real estate. Should Taiwan become part of Chinese territory, Beijing would likely seek to protect the island from neighboring countries (Japan, the Philippines) and U.S. forces in Guam, all of whom would likely have adjusted their military postures due to the proximity of an expanded China to their territories. The vicious circle that this would risk engendering isn’t too difficult to imagine.

All of this shows us that it would be nearly impossible to isolate the absorption of Taiwan from the region in which that transfer of power would occur. A neutral Taiwan is therefore the surest way to ensure stability in that corner of Northeast Asia all the way to the South China Sea.

#### The bargain is easily reversible by China — but once the U.S. gives up Taiwan, there’s no going back.

Roy 15 — Denny Roy, Senior Fellow and Supervisor of the POSCO Fellowship Program at the East-West Center—a U.S.-based institution for public diplomacy in the Asia Pacific region, former Professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, former Faculty Member in the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval Postgraduate School, former Research Fellow with the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University in Canberra, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago, 2015 (“The Impossible Price of a U.S.-China Grand Bargain: Dumping Taiwan,” *The National Interest*, June 24th, Available Online at <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-impossible-price-us-china-grand-bargain-dumping-taiwan-13177?page=show>, Accessed 06-28-2016)

Glaser recognizes that Chinese leaders may intend to push out their U.S. rival. He argues his proposal would answer the question of whether this is Beijing’s plan. If Beijing accepts the proposal, it would indicate that China has limited aims and can tolerate continued U.S. regional hegemony. If not, China intends to usurp that role from the United States. If we now recognize that expelling U.S. strategic leadership may be Beijing’s intention, unilaterally assisting the Chinese by abandoning Taiwan is not the most sensible policy if the US hopes to retain its accustomed role. The timing of Glaser’s proposal is particularly bad given that Xi Jinping’s government seems to represent a shift toward a more assertive Chinese foreign policy that has grown impatient with waiting for the United States to decline on its own.

Even if the current regime in Beijing does not plan to dismantle U.S. regional leadership, the United States cannot be sure the leaders of a future, stronger China will think the same way. China could renege on Glaser’s proposed deal more easily than the US could. China is a local power with relatively short supply lines to the East and South China Seas. In the case of the South China Sea, China enjoys a huge and growing military force projection disparity in its favor relative to the other claimants. But to cancel its part of the deal, the United States would have to cross the Pacific Ocean to invade and capture a Taiwan defended by ensconced PLA forces only 100 miles from China’s mainland.

#### The grand bargain isn’t binding on China — they’ll still challenge U.S. hegemony.

Lingwall 15 — Noah Lingwall, Student at the Schreyer Honors College and Paterno Fellow majoring in History and Global & International Studies at the Pennsylvania State University, Intern at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, 2015 (“The Taiwan Problem: If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It,” *The Diplomat*, August 8th, Available Online at <http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/the-taiwan-problem-if-it-aint-broke-dont-fix-it/>, Accessed 06-30-2016)

Even if China is willing to accept (in its view) an “invasive” U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific in the present, there is no mechanism to ensure that China does not default on agreements in the future. China’s military power projection capabilities are growing, and Chinese leaders may see fit to act in a fashion commensurate with their nation’s growing abilities. Therefore, the U.S. cannot expect a credible Chinese commitment to accept U.S. regional hegemony in exchange for control of Taiwan.

### They Say: “Japan Won’t Defect From The U.S. Alliance”

#### Even if they’re right about Japan, the plan results in Japanese militarization and crushes relations with other allies.

Roy 15 — Denny Roy, Senior Fellow and Supervisor of the POSCO Fellowship Program at the East-West Center—a U.S.-based institution for public diplomacy in the Asia Pacific region, former Professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, former Faculty Member in the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval Postgraduate School, former Research Fellow with the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University in Canberra, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago, 2015 (“The Impossible Price of a U.S.-China Grand Bargain: Dumping Taiwan,” *The National Interest*, June 24th, Available Online at <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-impossible-price-us-china-grand-bargain-dumping-taiwan-13177?page=show>, Accessed 06-28-2016)

Abandoning staunch, long-time friend like Taiwan would damage U.S. credibility in the eyes of other regional governments. Glaser argues that in the case of Japan, this damage would be containable. Tokyo realizes that compared to Taipei, its relationship with Washington is more strongly institutionalized. Japan also has nowhere else to go, he says, other than sticking with the United States. This is probably true, although U.S. abandonment of Taiwan would reinforce Japan’s fear regarding the long-term U.S. reliability to stand up to a strengthening China. This would embolden Japanese advocates of accommodating China, as well as those who call for a militarily strong Japan unleashed from the alliance. What about the damage to the reputation of the U.S. among friends in Seoul, Canberra, Manila, and elsewhere? Glaser mentions only Tokyo, the relatively easy case.

### They Say: “Plan Gets China To Accept U.S. Presence In East Asia”

#### The “accept U.S. presence” concession is meaningless — it won’t constrain Chinese behavior.

Roy 15 — Denny Roy, Senior Fellow and Supervisor of the POSCO Fellowship Program at the East-West Center—a U.S.-based institution for public diplomacy in the Asia Pacific region, former Professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, former Faculty Member in the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval Postgraduate School, former Research Fellow with the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University in Canberra, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago, 2015 (“The Impossible Price of a U.S.-China Grand Bargain: Dumping Taiwan,” *The National Interest*, June 24th, Available Online at <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-impossible-price-us-china-grand-bargain-dumping-taiwan-13177?page=show>, Accessed 06-28-2016)

The “grand bargain” idea probably resonates less with Beijing than Washington. From Beijing’s point of view, this would be asking it to trade something it believes it already owns for something else it believes it already owns. If they did agree, how the “bargain” would be operationalized is unclear. What would it mean for China to “officially accept” U.S. alliances and military bases in the Asia-Pacific? This would seem to require Beijing to renounce its proudly “principled” opposition to any country having “Cold War era” alliances and foreign bases. At the same time, it is easy to foresee China continuing its pre-bargain activities (military buildup, maneuvers with Russia, naval patrols in the East and South China Sea, etc.) while claiming these were not attempts to drive U.S. influence out of the region.

### They Say: “Other Policies Maintain Strong Alliances”

#### These policies would freak out China, reversing any gains from the plan.

Roy 15 — Denny Roy, Senior Fellow and Supervisor of the POSCO Fellowship Program at the East-West Center—a U.S.-based institution for public diplomacy in the Asia Pacific region, former Professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, former Faculty Member in the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval Postgraduate School, former Research Fellow with the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University in Canberra, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago, 2015 (“The Impossible Price of a U.S.-China Grand Bargain: Dumping Taiwan,” *The National Interest*, June 24th, Available Online at <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-impossible-price-us-china-grand-bargain-dumping-taiwan-13177?page=show>, Accessed 06-28-2016)

Ultimately, Glaser’s idea founders on the contradiction between assuring China and assuring allies who fear China. Admitting that regional confidence in U.S. reliability would suffer if Washington stopped supporting Taiwan, Glaser argues that Washington would need to compensate for this reputational setback by increasing U.S. military forces in the region, investing in stronger capabilities, and deepening ties between US and allied military commands. These compensatory moves, however, would go a long way toward reviving the very fears that the “grand bargain” was intended to alleviate. It is questionable that China would feel much more secure if the price of gaining control over Taiwan was a permanently stronger US military presence in the region.

Glaser’s view of the protection of a democratic Taiwan as superfluous rather than intrinsic to America’s “longstanding military security role in East Asia” is erroneous. Therefore a bargaining away of US support for Taiwan – especially for a doubtful payoff – is no way to strengthen America’s regional leadership.

## Strategic Clarity CP

### 1NC — Strategic Clarity CP

#### First/next off is the Strategic Clarity Counterplan.

#### The United States federal government should openly clarify that it would defend Taiwan against unprovoked Chinese aggression and reinforce its military capability to defend Taiwan.

#### The counterplan deters China from acting aggressively toward Taiwan — U.S. strategic ambiguity is the only reason they might miscalculate and invade.

Colby and Slocombe 16 — Elbridge Colby, Robert M. Gates Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, Member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the International Institute of Strategic Studies, formerly served as a Policy Advisor to the Secretary of Defense’s Representative for the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, as an Expert Advisor to the Congressional Strategic Posture Commission, as a staff member on the President’s Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the U.S. Regarding WMD, with the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, and with the State Department, recipient of the Exceptional Public Service Award from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and of the Superior and Meritorious Honor Awards from the Department of State, holds a J.D. from Yale Law School, and Walter Slocombe, Senior Counsel at Caplin & Drysdale—a law firm, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, former Senior Advisor for National Defense in the Coalition Provisional Authority for Iraq, former Member of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, holds a J.D. from Harvard Law School, 2016 (“U.S. ‘Ambiguity’ on Taiwan Is Dangerous,” *Wall Street Journal*, May 23rd, Available Online at <http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-ambiguity-on-taiwan-is-dangerous-1464022837>, Accessed 06-28-2016)

If China were to attack Taiwan, would American forces come to the island’s defense? It is hard to know because the U.S. maintains a policy of “strategic ambiguity” concerning how it would respond. It’s time for that to change.

The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 states only that the U.S. would regard such an attack as of “grave concern,” and only commits the U.S. to maintaining the ability to defend the island. This is a much less firm commitment than the U.S. offers in NATO and to allies Japan and South Korea. But the U.S. stakes in defending a democratic Taiwan and maintaining the credibility of the overall U.S. alliance structure are no less significant.

The benefits of this approach long outweighed its risks. It preserved flexibility, was less offensive to Beijing and signaled to Taipei the need to tread gingerly on sovereignty issues. Beijing meanwhile appeared content to try honey rather than vinegar in coaxing Taiwan toward unification.

Moreover, China lacked the military capabilities to subjugate Taiwan. The U.S. was so dominant militarily that Beijing’s only plausible course was to tolerate the status quo.

But this calculus no longer obtains. The military balance is shifting in Beijing’s favor. Sources as diverse as Taiwan’s government and the RAND Corporation have publicly judged that within a few short years any U.S. defense of the island will be extremely demanding. Blocking a Chinese assault will still be possible for the U.S., but it will be harder, riskier and more costly than before.

This means that the situation is changing from one in which Beijing would have been foolhardy to attack Taiwan to one in which it may seem an increasingly viable option. Beijing may even deem it necessary to keep alive its ambition of uniting the island with the mainland.

Polls show that Taiwan’s residents overwhelmingly prefer the status quo or independence, and fewer identify as Chinese as time goes on. Given that there are already substantial economic links with the mainland, why should Beijing expect support for unification to grow suddenly, particularly in light of China’s turn away from liberalization under Xi Jinping and the discouraging example of Hong Kong?

Thus, sooner or later, China may decide that Taiwan is very unlikely to simply fall into its lap—and will be increasingly tempted to turn to coercion.

This emerging situation is particularly dangerous because ambiguity can heighten the likelihood of war when military strength becomes more evenly balanced. History is replete with examples of countries starting wars, even against much stronger powers, based on the belief that their strength or resolve over some issue was greater than that of their foes, and that their opponents wouldn’t fight at all or hard enough. Thus Kim Il Sung invaded South Korea in 1950, with Soviet and Chinese support, believing the U.S. wouldn’t come to the South’s defense.

Beijing could make a similar miscalculation about U.S. resolve over Taiwan. It might well assess U.S. ambiguity as indicating that, confronted with a tough and costly fight over Taiwan, the U.S. would decide not to go to war or not to fight hard enough to prevent Beijing from achieving its core goals.

This perilous situation will only grow worse as China gets stronger. For the sake of deterrence and stability, it is essential that Beijing understand that using force would mean a stout U.S. intervention.

To contribute to this deterrent, the U.S. should pursue two paths. First, it should reinforce its military capability to defend Taiwan, impose costs on China and lessen the costs and risks to itself of doing so.

Second, Washington should bolster the credibility of its “no use of force” policy by making clearer the conditions under which it would fight. In particular, it should openly and forthrightly specify that the U.S. would defend Taiwan against unprovoked Chinese aggression. Clarifying these circumstances would reduce the risk that Beijing would think it can assault Taiwan without triggering a serious U.S. defense of the island.

Washington should also press Taipei to upgrade its own defenses and to avoid actions that could justifiably be seen as unreasonable. The most prominent element of this must be political restraint and coordination with Washington by Taipei.

At the same time, it is unreasonable for the people of Taiwan to expect Americans to be more vigorous in their defense than they are. As annual Chinese defense spending has ballooned in recent years, Taiwan’s has merely inched to $11 billion from $10 billion. Taiwan should commit to spending at least 2.5% of its GDP on defense (which is what South Korea spends in the face of a far less capable North Korea), up from about 2% today, and should shift its own defense investments from “shiny objects” like F-16s toward capabilities more closely tied to repelling a Chinese attack, such as anti-ship and anti-air systems, mines and special forces.

Clarifying U.S. commitments to Taiwan would be uncomfortable, but continued ambiguity risks China thinking that the gains from starting a war are worth the candle, and America either balking at the moment of crisis or fighting a war it might very well have deterred. Clarity would be controversial but safer.

### Solvency

#### The counterplan prevents miscalculation and spurs cross-strait negotiations.

Cole 12 — J. Michael Cole, Associate Researcher at the French Centre for Research on Contemporary China, Senior Non-Resident Fellow at the China Policy Institute at the University of Nottingham, China Correspondent for *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Senior Member and Editor in Chief at the Thinking Taiwan Foundation—a Taiwanese English-language publication founded by current Taiwanese President Dr. Tsai Ing-wen that provides nonpartisan analysis and commentary, former Deputy News Chief and Reporter for the *Taipei Times*, former Analyst with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, holds a Master’s in War Studies from the Royal Military College of Canada, 2012 (“Time To End U.S. 'Ambiguity' on Taiwan,” *The Diplomat*, July 6th, Available Online at http://thediplomat.com/2012/07/time-to-end-u-s-ambiguity-on-taiwan/, Accessed 06-28-2016)

The best way to avoid war over Taiwan and to ensure that U.S. forces are not wrong-footed should such a scenario unfold, therefore, is for Washington to put an end to its strategic ambiguity and to clearly state that it will defend Taiwan should China threaten force against it. By doing so, the U.S. would not only ensure that Beijing does not miscalculate by believing it can use the military option on the cheap — thereby lowering the probability of armed conflict — it would also provide Taipei with the backing it needs to negotiate with Beijing as an equal rather than a weaker party coerced into making political concessions against the wishes of its population.

#### The counterplan buys time for peaceful resolution — deterrence solves the case and avoids the disad(s).

Cole 15 — J. Michael Cole, Associate Researcher at the French Centre for Research on Contemporary China, Senior Non-Resident Fellow at the China Policy Institute at the University of Nottingham, China Correspondent for *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Senior Member and Editor in Chief at the Thinking Taiwan Foundation—a Taiwanese English-language publication founded by current Taiwanese President Dr. Tsai Ing-wen that provides nonpartisan analysis and commentary, former Deputy News Chief and Reporter for the *Taipei Times*, former Analyst with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, holds a Master’s in War Studies from the Royal Military College of Canada, 2015 (“If the Unthinkable Occurred: America Should Stand Up to China over Taiwan,” *The National Interest*, May 7th, Available Online at http://nationalinterest.org/feature/if-the-unthinkable-occured-america-should-stand-china-over-12825?page=show, Accessed 06-30-2016)

Opposing authoritarian China’s designs on Taiwan, and extending to Taiwanese the right to self-determination that is theirs, also need not inevitably lead to war. As discussed in this article, there are several steps that the international community and Taiwan itself can take to reduce the risks of war in the Taiwan Strait, chief among them a strong and concerted deterrent strategy. Surrendering to blackmail by powerful states—White’s prescription—would turn back the clock. In fact, doing so would deny those in China who seek alternatives to belligerence and repression the chance to play a leading role in shaping a new international system. By keeping the aggressors in check, deterrence can buy us time and facilitate the emergence of a leadership in Beijing that is more liberal and perhaps less inclined to throw its weight around. Conversely, give in to coercion and you feed the beast.

#### The counterplan creates a stronger deterrent to Chinese aggression.

Cole 15 — J. Michael Cole, Associate Researcher at the French Centre for Research on Contemporary China, Senior Non-Resident Fellow at the China Policy Institute at the University of Nottingham, China Correspondent for *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Senior Member and Editor in Chief at the Thinking Taiwan Foundation—a Taiwanese English-language publication founded by current Taiwanese President Dr. Tsai Ing-wen that provides nonpartisan analysis and commentary, former Deputy News Chief and Reporter for the *Taipei Times*, former Analyst with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, holds a Master’s in War Studies from the Royal Military College of Canada, 2015 (“If the Unthinkable Occurred: America Should Stand Up to China over Taiwan,” *The National Interest*, May 7th, Available Online at http://nationalinterest.org/feature/if-the-unthinkable-occured-america-should-stand-china-over-12825?page=show, Accessed 06-30-2016)

Another flaw in White’s argument is that it only provides binary options—capitulation, or the descent into major (perhaps nuclear) war and the collapse of the global economy. He leaves no room for other (and in my opinion, far more plausible) scenarios. The key to the continued existence of Taiwan (or the Republic of China) as a free, democratic and independent state lies not in the ability of the island and its security guarantors to defeat China in a major war, but rather in the strength of its deterrent, a concept that is inexplicably ignored by White. Everybody agrees that major war in the Taiwan Strait, especially one that drags the United States and perhaps Japan into hostilities, would be as devastating as it is undesirable. But the answer to that reality isn’t the abandonment of one’s principles (not to mention that of 23 million people), but instead a firm commitment to war avoidance. As I argued in a previous article, a multifaceted deterrent strategy involving both military and nonmilitary components (sanctions, naval embargo and so on), combined with clear red lines based upon international law, would lower the risk that China—export reliant and beholden to foreign energy sources—would miscalculate and choose the military option to resolve the Taiwan “issue” once and for all.

#### Strategic ambiguity invites aggression — the counterplan is key to deter China.

Cole 12 — J. Michael Cole, Associate Researcher at the French Centre for Research on Contemporary China, Senior Non-Resident Fellow at the China Policy Institute at the University of Nottingham, China Correspondent for *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Senior Member and Editor in Chief at the Thinking Taiwan Foundation—a Taiwanese English-language publication founded by current Taiwanese President Dr. Tsai Ing-wen that provides nonpartisan analysis and commentary, former Deputy News Chief and Reporter for the *Taipei Times*, former Analyst with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, holds a Master’s in War Studies from the Royal Military College of Canada, 2012 (“Time To End U.S. 'Ambiguity' on Taiwan,” *The Diplomat*, July 6th, Available Online at http://thediplomat.com/2012/07/time-to-end-u-s-ambiguity-on-taiwan/, Accessed 06-28-2016)

For the more than three decades since the United States’ recognition of the People’s Republic of China, Washington has relied on strategic ambiguity to deter China from using force against Taiwan. Although the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, passed by Congress after U.S. President Jimmy Carter established diplomatic relations with Beijing, calls for the U.S. to help Taiwan defend itself, in application the U.S. has often kept the two sides guessing at its willingness to intervene in a conflict, and if so, in what capacity.

Such ambiguity worked for three decades, but it won’t last for much longer.

As long as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) remained the weaker party in the trilateral relationship, ambiguity was sufficient to deter China from launching an attack on Taiwan. With China’s emergence as an economic powerhouse, and its concurrent military buildup, that ambiguity has not only lost its effectiveness — it is now an invitation for adventurism.

#### Expanded military support for Taiwan is key to deter China.

Lee 11 — Shyu-Tu Lee, President of the North America Taiwanese Professors' Association, 2011 (“Disengaging From Taiwan,” *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 90, Issue 4, July/August, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Academic Search Elite)

To avoid that fate, Washington must reiterate that the future of Taiwan must be resolved peacefully and with the assent of the Taiwanese people. It must deploy sufficient naval and air forces in the western Pacific to deter Chinese aggression, initiate high-level military exchanges with Taiwan to facilitate joint military planning, and speed up the sale to Taiwan of F-16 fighters and other weapons that would be useful in resisting a Chinese invasion.

#### U.S. support for Taiwan is key to maintain effective deterrence.

Paal 11 — Douglas Paal, Vice President for Studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, former Vice Chairman of JPMorgan Chase International, former unofficial U.S. representative to Taiwan as director of the American Institute in Taiwan (2002-2006), formerly served as Director of Asian Affairs and Senior Director and Special Assistant to the President on the National Security Council staffs of Presidents Reagan and George H. W. Bush, former Senior Analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency, holds a Ph.D. in History and East Asian Languages from Harvard University, 2011 (“Accommodation Will Not Work,” *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 90, Issue 4, July/August, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Academic Search Elite)

There is a reason that eight U.S. administrations have embraced the same policy toward China and Taiwan, and that is because it serves U.S. interests in peace, prosperity, and stability. U.S. arms sales to Taiwan are an important part of maintaining peace in the western Pacific. Despite a gradual easing of tensions between China and Taiwan, Beijing continues to enhance its military capabilities with regard to Taipei. This has developed a vicious cycle. By choosing to increase the military offensive capability deployed opposite Taiwan, Beijing compels Taiwan's leadership to seek outside sources of support and arms to deter Chinese aggression. If Taiwan's leaders failed to find that support, their voters would remove them. Only the United States has the will to fulfill Taiwan's request, compelling any U.S. administration to respond or suffer politically at home. This, in turn, compels Beijing to react strongly to what it considers interference in its internal affairs, since it claims Taiwan as part of China.

If the cycle is to be broken, it needs to start with the mainland's choice to increase or decrease its military deployments, not with Washington conceding Taiwan to Beijing.

# Case

## Nuclear War Advantage Answers

### 1NC — Nuclear War Advantage

#### 1. No War — China won’t sacrifice its economy to annex Taiwan.

Cole 15 — J. Michael Cole, Associate Researcher at the French Centre for Research on Contemporary China, Senior Non-Resident Fellow at the China Policy Institute at the University of Nottingham, China Correspondent for *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Senior Member and Editor in Chief at the Thinking Taiwan Foundation—a Taiwanese English-language publication founded by current Taiwanese President Dr. Tsai Ing-wen that provides nonpartisan analysis and commentary, former Deputy News Chief and Reporter for the *Taipei Times*, former Analyst with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, holds a Master’s in War Studies from the Royal Military College of Canada, 2015 (“If the Unthinkable Occurred: America Should Stand Up to China over Taiwan,” *The National Interest*, May 7th, Available Online at http://nationalinterest.org/feature/if-the-unthinkable-occured-america-should-stand-china-over-12825?page=show, Accessed 06-30-2016)

Ironically, White seems almost convinced that China would be willing to engage in nuclear war over Taiwan, an assumption that is both untested and portrays the leadership in Beijing as a bunch of deranged nihilists. For all its faults, and despite the official rhetoric depicting Taiwan as a “core issue,” it is in my view unlikely that the Chinese Communist Party would unleash its nuclear arsenal over the matter of Taiwan; in fact, I would advance that it is probably unwilling to gamble China’s economy over Taiwan by launching major military operations—all the more so if there is a promise that such a course of action would result in a concerted response on the part of the international community. The logic of deterrence is that it diminishes the likelihood that the international community would be faced with the maximalist options given us by White. (The bluster only works if we believe it—and Beijing wants us to believe it just like the good professor seems to do—as winning without a fight is a foundational element of Chinese military strategy.)

#### 2. Turn — the plan causes China-Taiwan war. Taiwan won’t go down without a fight.

Roy 12 — Denny Roy, Senior Fellow and Supervisor of the POSCO Fellowship Program at the East-West Center—a U.S.-based institution for public diplomacy in the Asia Pacific region, former Professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, former Faculty Member in the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval Postgraduate School, former Research Fellow with the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University in Canberra, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago, 2012 (“Why the U.S. shouldn't abandon Taiwan,” *Time*, December 6th, Available Online at http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/12/06/why-the-u-s-shouldnt-abandon-taiwan/, Accessed 06-28-2016)

Advocates of abandoning Taiwan may erroneously believe that halting U.S. military and diplomatic support for Taipei would reduce tensions in East Asia. This is certainly what Beijing would have us believe. According to Chinese officials and commentators, U.S. assistance to Taipei is all that stands in the way of peaceful unification, and without it the people of Taiwan would stop resisting and accept Beijing’s terms for unification. This premise, however, ignores an important reality: the main obstacle to unification is not U.S. arms sales, but rather Taiwanese nationalism and the wish of nearly all Taiwan’s people not to be ruled by the Chinese Communist Party. Thus, withdrawal of U.S. support would not necessarily lead to a peaceful resolution of the cross-Strait imbroglio. The opposite outcome is at least as likely. Deterrence against an attack by the People’s Liberation Army would be weakened, while Taiwan’s people may well choose to fight rather than capitulate.

#### 3. No Solvency — concessions won’t change China’s long-term behavior.

Jackson 15 — Van Jackson, Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, International Affairs Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Visiting Scholar and Adjunct Assistant Professor with the Asian Studies Program in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, former Strategist and Policy Adviser focused on the Asia-Pacific at the Office of the Secretary of Defense, holds a Ph.D. in World Politics from The Catholic University of America, 2015 (“The Myth of a US-China Grand Bargain,” *The Diplomat*, August 6th, Available Online at <http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/the-myth-of-a-us-china-grand-bargain/>, Accessed 06-28-2016)

But grand bargains rarely work. There’s a dangerous naivete in abandoning U.S. commitments on the hope that China will then be more willing to resolve its other disputes. And policies of accommodation will not suspend military competition because that involves more than present day concerns with surveillance overflight missions, territorial disputes, and current political commitments. Regardless of the policy and crisis management decisions we make today, military competition plays out over years and decades; it relates to force structure investment and doctrinal decisions that can’t be sacrificed for political promises.

#### 4. Status Quo Solves — economic cooperation is resolving tensions.

Lingwall 15 — Noah Lingwall, Student at the Schreyer Honors College and Paterno Fellow majoring in History and Global & International Studies at the Pennsylvania State University, Intern at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, 2015 (“The Taiwan Problem: If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It,” *The Diplomat*, August 8th, Available Online at <http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/the-taiwan-problem-if-it-aint-broke-dont-fix-it/>, Accessed 06-30-2016)

No Panacea

The concept of a U.S.-China grand bargain offers a creative attempt at a strategy to resolve some of the most intractable issues hindering improved cooperation between the two countries. Even if implemented, this proposed strategy would not serve as a panacea to all the issues facing the United States and China. Any bargain would face serious pitfalls that would cast doubt over the longevity of its provisions. In light of the contentious land disputes in the South China Sea and continuing tension over the unresolved question of Taiwan, an idealistic resolution might seem a productive step forward.

The Taiwan problem is deeply entrenched within China and Taiwan’s political culture and it cannot be solved in one fell swoop. A grand bargain is an encouraging, yet illusive notion. The framework of a grand bargain might serve as a useful blueprint for future cooperation, but the current status quo already acts as a positive foundation for future China-Taiwan relations and should remain in place.

As Taiwan’s March 2016 presidential election rapidly approaches, the concept of a grand bargain appears particularly ill-conceived. In all likelihood, neither party’s candidate will risk alienating public support by pushing a radical plan for unification or separation. Increased economic cooperation will continue to maintain the equilibrium between the two nations and could even mitigate the most contentious issues that bedevil U.S.-China and China-Taiwan relations. While it is possible that these issues may pose a future threat, the current Taiwan problem is not broken, and there is no need to fix it.

### Extend: “No U.S.-China Taiwan War”

#### No U.S.-China war — economic ties and deterrence.

Gelb 13 — Leslie H. Gelb, President Emeritus and Board Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, former Pulitzer Prize winning journalist and columnist for the *New York Times*, served as Assistant Secretary of State in the Carter Administration and was the recipient of the Distinguished Honor Award—the State Department’s highest honor, served as Director of Policy Planning and Arms Control for International Security Affairs at the Department of Defense where he was the recipient of the Distinguished Service Award—the Defense Department’s highest honor, holds a Ph.D. from Harvard University, 2013 (“Is a military conflict between China and the United States possible in the future?,” *Ask CFR Experts*—a Council on Foreign Relations blog, Question submitted by Josh Wartel from Lake Braddock Secondary School, September 9th, Available Online at <http://www.cfr.org/china/military-conflict-between-china-united-states-possible-future/p31361?cid=rss-fullfeed-is_a_military_conflict_between-090913>, Accessed 09-12-2013)

Is a military conflict between China and the United States possible in the future?

There is almost never a time when people do not worry about war between major powers. The history here is not a happy one. But there are good reasons to expect a better outcome in the 21st century—as long as both sides are alert and careful.

The stakes are much too high for either Beijing or Washington to expect direct military confrontations. Two-way trade and investment are quite high. China holds almost $1.2 trillion in American debt. By contrast, during the Cold War, the United States had virtually no economic ties with the Soviet Union—and both sides still went out of their way to avoid war because of the dangers of escalation into nuclear war. The nightmare of nuclear war hangs over the Chinese-American relationship today. It is clear neither side wants to come anywhere near this ultimate danger.

None of this is to say that both sides will not continue to build up their military capability. No country is adding to its military punch faster than China. But it is still far behind the United States in usable military capability, that is, force that can be applied effectively and decidedly in various situations. Chinese military strength is limited almost entirely to lands and seas bordering its own territory. The United States is still the only global military power.

And it is difficult to see what Beijing might calculate is worth a war or even the risk of war. It has boundary disputes with Vietnam, the Philippines and others in the South China Sea, and with Japan up north. Troubles should be expected there, and China will certainly be testing Washington's will in both places. Chinese leaders, however, continue to focus on their nation's economic development, and war would certainly set that back.

#### China *won’t* risk invading Taiwan — they want to win the war *without a fight*.

Cole 15 — J. Michael Cole, Associate Researcher at the French Centre for Research on Contemporary China, Senior Non-Resident Fellow at the China Policy Institute at the University of Nottingham, China Correspondent for *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Senior Member and Editor in Chief at the Thinking Taiwan Foundation—a Taiwanese English-language publication founded by current Taiwanese President Dr. Tsai Ing-wen that provides nonpartisan analysis and commentary, former Deputy News Chief and Reporter for the *Taipei Times*, former Analyst with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, holds a Master’s in War Studies from the Royal Military College of Canada, 2015 (“Don't Let China Swallow Taiwan,” *The National Interest*, April 23rd, Available Online at <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/dont-let-china-swallow-taiwan-12708?page=show>, Accessed 06-28-2016)

Yet another flaw in White’s worldview is his depiction of Beijing as an unbeatable opponent. He writes:

the stark reality is that these days, there is not much the US can realistically do to help Taipei stand up to serious pressure from Beijing.

Back in 1996 when they last went toe-to-toe over Taiwan, the US could simply send a couple of aircraft carriers into the area to force China to back off. Today the balance of power is vastly different: China can sink the carriers, and their economies are so intertwined that trade sanctions of the kind the US used against Russia recently are simply unthinkable.

He continues:

Any US effort to support Taiwan militarily against China would be almost certain to escalate into a full-scale US-China war and quite possibly a nuclear exchange. That would be a disaster for everyone, including, of course, the people of Taiwan itself—far worse than reunification, in fact.

Not only is this defeatism, it treats China as if it did not rely just as heavily on the world economy for its own prosperity. It also assumes that the untested Chinese military would prevail in any scenario and would even risk nuclear annihilation for the sake of seizing Taiwan, which arguably misreads the intentions (and pragmatism) of the Chinese leadership, whose main strategy is to achieve exactly what White counsels in his article—to win the war against Taiwan without a fight, to have it handed over on a silver platter.

For all its might, China isn’t above the sting of sanctions or embarrassing defeats in wartime, given that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) hasn’t had actual combat experience since 1979 when it ventured into Vietnam and got a bloody nose for its troubles.

#### If China really *is* willing to wage nuclear war to annex Taiwan, the counterplan is better than the plan.

Cole 15 — J. Michael Cole, Associate Researcher at the French Centre for Research on Contemporary China, Senior Non-Resident Fellow at the China Policy Institute at the University of Nottingham, China Correspondent for *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Senior Member and Editor in Chief at the Thinking Taiwan Foundation—a Taiwanese English-language publication founded by current Taiwanese President Dr. Tsai Ing-wen that provides nonpartisan analysis and commentary, former Deputy News Chief and Reporter for the *Taipei Times*, former Analyst with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, holds a Master’s in War Studies from the Royal Military College of Canada, 2015 (“If the Unthinkable Occurred: America Should Stand Up to China over Taiwan,” *The National Interest*, May 7th, Available Online at http://nationalinterest.org/feature/if-the-unthinkable-occured-america-should-stand-china-over-12825?page=show, Accessed 06-30-2016)

If, however, Beijing were committed to a nuclear policy and willing to cause and suffer millions of deaths to annex Taiwan, a country that is 1/267th the size of China, then I would say that we have all the reasons in the world to oppose it, as giving in to its blackmail would unleash upon the world a beast of unmitigated evil.

### Extend: “Plan Causes China-Taiwan War”

#### A China-Taiwan war would draw-in the U.S., turning the case.

Cole 11 — J. Michael Cole, Associate Researcher at the French Centre for Research on Contemporary China, Senior Non-Resident Fellow at the China Policy Institute at the University of Nottingham, China Correspondent for *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Senior Member and Editor in Chief at the Thinking Taiwan Foundation—a Taiwanese English-language publication founded by current Taiwanese President Dr. Tsai Ing-wen that provides nonpartisan analysis and commentary, former Deputy News Chief and Reporter for the *Taipei Times*, former Analyst with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, holds a Master’s in War Studies from the Royal Military College of Canada, 2011 (“Realism does not mean inhumanity,” *Taipei Times*, March 4th, Available Online at http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/print/2011/03/04/2003497298, Accessed 06-30-2016)

Lastly, it is unlikely Taiwanese would go gently into the night and allow their hard-earned democracy and freedoms to be devoured by the wolves simply for the sake of regional stability, or because the US followed Glaser’s advice and “abandoned” them. They would resist, and from that resistance would come tremendous pressure on the US and its allies to act. In other words, besides highlighting his poor moral judgment, Glaser’s gamble could make armed conflict between the US and China more likely rather than less.

#### Taiwan won’t accept CCP control — they’ll put up a fight.

Roy 15 — Denny Roy, Senior Fellow and Supervisor of the POSCO Fellowship Program at the East-West Center—a U.S.-based institution for public diplomacy in the Asia Pacific region, former Professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, former Faculty Member in the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval Postgraduate School, former Research Fellow with the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University in Canberra, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago, 2015 (“The Impossible Price of a U.S.-China Grand Bargain: Dumping Taiwan,” *The National Interest*, June 24th, Available Online at <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-impossible-price-us-china-grand-bargain-dumping-taiwan-13177?page=show>, Accessed 06-28-2016)

Glaser focuses on the US interest in avoiding a war with China. But what about the U.S. interest in preventing a Taiwan-China war? One of the main reasons for U.S. forward deployment is to help keep the region stable. The PRC argues that the Taiwan “separatist” challenge would quickly dry up if the U.S. stopped selling weapons to Taiwan, but Taipei has argued the opposite: cross-Strait stability is possible only if Taiwan feels secure, and the Republic of China (ROC) will not negotiate with China under the gun. Beijing should not assume Taiwan would be quick to surrender even in a disadvantageous situation.

#### This increases tensions.

Paal 11 — Douglas Paal, Vice President for Studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, former Vice Chairman of JPMorgan Chase International, former unofficial U.S. representative to Taiwan as director of the American Institute in Taiwan (2002-2006), formerly served as Director of Asian Affairs and Senior Director and Special Assistant to the President on the National Security Council staffs of Presidents Reagan and George H. W. Bush, former Senior Analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency, holds a Ph.D. in History and East Asian Languages from Harvard University, 2011 (“Accommodation Will Not Work,” *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 90, Issue 4, July/August, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Academic Search Elite)

The unstated premise of Charles Glaser's recommendation of "accommodation" to China over Taiwan ("Will China's Rise Lead to War?" March/April 2011) is that the people of Taiwan would have no say in this decision.

From the early years of the United States' relationship with the People's Republic of China, U.S. presidents have wrestled with strong domestic political support for continued good relations with Taiwan, whatever new arrangements might be reached with Beijing. Over eight successive presidential administrations, this support has morphed from an implicit to an explicit tenet of U.S. policy: the outcome between China and Taiwan must be decided with the assent of the Taiwanese people.

Glaser would do well to explain how Taiwanese public opinion would factor into his recommendation. What if an administration took his advice and the people of Taiwan rejected it? Can a desperate bolt for de jure independence be ruled out? Could China's leaders restrain themselves from rushing to grab the spoils to satisfy nationalist opinion and Beijing's long-standing claims on Taiwan? Would any of these outcomes bring about the stability in U.S.-Chinese relations that Glaser seeks? The outlook is doubtful and likely to produce more tensions than reduce existing ones.

#### That turns the case.

Cole 15 — J. Michael Cole, Associate Researcher at the French Centre for Research on Contemporary China, Senior Non-Resident Fellow at the China Policy Institute at the University of Nottingham, China Correspondent for *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Senior Member and Editor in Chief at the Thinking Taiwan Foundation—a Taiwanese English-language publication founded by current Taiwanese President Dr. Tsai Ing-wen that provides nonpartisan analysis and commentary, former Deputy News Chief and Reporter for the *Taipei Times*, former Analyst with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, holds a Master’s in War Studies from the Royal Military College of Canada, 2015 (“The Question That Is Never Asked: What Do the Taiwanese Want?,” *The Diplomat*, May 13th, Available Online at http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/the-question-that-is-never-asked-what-do-the-taiwanese-want/, Accessed 06-30-2016)

However convenient it might be to ignore the voice of the Taiwanese, the fact is that “blue” or “green” they are serious about protecting the way of life that makes Taiwan a distinct political entity, a deeply anchored form of resilience that goes well beyond the country’s ability to defend itself militarily.

Strategists may think that they have found the perfect solution to the “Taiwan question” in the form of some “grand bargain.” But what good is all this if the principal characters—the people who stand to be affected the most—refuse to play along, not because they are stubborn or against “peace,” but because it is their right, because the “choice” that is given them is a rotten one? The consensus within Taiwanese society favoring independence (including the idea of the “status quo”) is such that a “solution” imposed externally which does not take the views of the Taiwanese into account would spark major unrest and likely lead to the very hostilities that the academics mentioned above are hoping to avert.

#### Japan also gets drawn-in — they’ll try to defend Taiwan.

Cole 15 — J. Michael Cole, Associate Researcher at the French Centre for Research on Contemporary China, Senior Non-Resident Fellow at the China Policy Institute at the University of Nottingham, China Correspondent for *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Senior Member and Editor in Chief at the Thinking Taiwan Foundation—a Taiwanese English-language publication founded by current Taiwanese President Dr. Tsai Ing-wen that provides nonpartisan analysis and commentary, former Deputy News Chief and Reporter for the *Taipei Times*, former Analyst with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, holds a Master’s in War Studies from the Royal Military College of Canada, 2015 (“Don't Let China Swallow Taiwan,” *The National Interest*, April 23rd, Available Online at <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/dont-let-china-swallow-taiwan-12708?page=show>, Accessed 06-28-2016)

In the present scenario, we should also not discount Tokyo’s ability and desire to ensure that Taiwan doesn’t fall into China’s hands. As a pillar of the U.S. security architecture in the Asia-Pacific, Japan is unlikely to sit by idly as its next-door neighbor is taken over by China.

## U.S.-China Relations Advantage Answers

### 1NC — U.S.-China Relations Advantage

#### 1. Taiwan Not Key — U.S. support *doesn’t* undermine U.S.-China relations.

Lingwall 15 — Noah Lingwall, Student at the Schreyer Honors College and Paterno Fellow majoring in History and Global & International Studies at the Pennsylvania State University, Intern at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, 2015 (“The Taiwan Problem: If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It,” *The Diplomat*, August 8th, Available Online at <http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/the-taiwan-problem-if-it-aint-broke-dont-fix-it/>, Accessed 06-30-2016)

Myth #1: Taiwan Is an Obstacle to Better U.S.-China Relations

Glaser and others who espouse the benefits of a U.S.-China grand bargain allege that the unresolved question of Taiwanese independence has impeded healthy U.S.-China relations. To test this assertion, it is important to consider the reality of recent China-Taiwan interactions.

The issues of Taiwan’s disputed status and U.S. arms sales to Taiwan remain perhaps the most outstanding problems between the United States and China. Still, even these issues no longer impede U.S.-China relations. The question of Taiwanese independence emerged in the 1990s with the nation’s transition to democracy. As the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) gained control over Taiwan in subsequent elections, then-President Chen Shui-bian amplified Taiwan’s calls for independence. The 2005 passage of the Anti-Secession Law\* in China served as a sharp response to Taiwan’s ambitions for independence. Meanwhile, former President George W. Bush clarified the U.S. position of “strategic ambiguity” over the Taiwan issue with a powerful proclamation: The United States would not want to see Taiwan provoke China, but the United States would help defend Taiwan if China were to lose its patience with Taiwan and use force to achieve unification with the island. This statement made it clear that the United States did not support either formal Taiwanese independence or forceful unification. This policy position effectively stabilized the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. Since then, no further attempts have been made to upend the balance between China and Taiwan.

Nor should U.S. arms sales to Taiwan be regarded as a serious barrier to U.S.-China relations. The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 stipulates that the United States will provide Taiwan with arms of a defense nature. Although China often uses the United States’ periodic decision to sell arms to Taiwan as a political ploy to suspend the Chinese military’s contact with the United States and stir up nationalistic sentiments, the issue needs to be put into perspective. While all arms are technically offensive in nature, the quantity and quality of the weapons Taiwan receives from the United States do little Taiwan’s offensive capabilities. For example, Taiwan purchases short-range fighter jets, air defense systems, and older-generation weapons.

In addition, U.S. authorization to sell arms to Taiwan differs from the actual delivery of weapon systems. The United States has declined to provide the quality of weapons that Taiwan has requested from time to time. Moreover, Taiwan’s legislature has often failed to appropriate the funds necessary to purchase the quantity of weapons requested.

Finally, China’s periodic suspensions of its military contacts with the United States have failed to inflict significant damage on U.S.-China relations and relations are regularly quietly restored once the political storm subsides. Beijing understands that Taiwan’s weaponry does not pose a serious threat to mainland China’s military. Bearing this in mind, it seems evident that U.S. arms sales to Taiwan act as mere political pretense for China’s antagonistic behavior and are not serious obstacles.

In fact, the past several decades have produced a relatively stable economic and political equilibrium between China and Taiwan. Most recently, the 2008 election of President Ma Ying-jeou has ushered in an era of unprecedented China-Taiwan cooperation. Economic integration, highlighted by a 2010 bilateral trade agreement, has inextricably linked Beijing and Taipei. In fact, the health of Taiwan’s economy relies on revenue from Chinese trade. According to 2014 Chinese statistics, trade volume between the two nations totaled more than 200 billion dollars. Taiwan also exports most of its goods to China and enjoys a huge trade surplus. Yearly trends indicate that the economic bonds between the two nations are getting even stronger: From 2014 to 2015, trade between the two nations increased 16.7 per cent.

#### 2. No Solvency — a grand bargain *won’t* restore strong relations.

Roy 12 — Denny Roy, Senior Fellow and Supervisor of the POSCO Fellowship Program at the East-West Center—a U.S.-based institution for public diplomacy in the Asia Pacific region, former Professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, former Faculty Member in the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval Postgraduate School, former Research Fellow with the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University in Canberra, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago, 2012 (“Why the U.S. shouldn't abandon Taiwan,” *Time*, December 6th, Available Online at http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/12/06/why-the-u-s-shouldnt-abandon-taiwan/, Accessed 06-28-2016)

Another dubious assumption is that removing the Taiwan issue from U.S.-China relations would clear the way for a vastly improved bilateral relationship. It is true that Taiwan is the greatest single irritant in U.S.-China relations, that U.S. support for Taiwan reinforces Chinese suspicions of an American “containment” strategy, and that the cross-Strait war scenario is a major rationale for China’s military modernization and buildup. But neither U.S.-China relations nor Chinese regional behavior would improve much, if at all, as a result of a U.S. sellout of Taiwan. The Chinese would still have many other reasons to believe the United States is trying to keep China from rising, such as the U.S. alliances, increased American security cooperation with other governments in the region, and the alleged American “meddling” in the South China Sea dispute.

#### 3. No Spillover To Other Issues — China will pocket the concession without supporting the U.S.’s agenda.

Roy 12 — Denny Roy, Senior Fellow and Supervisor of the POSCO Fellowship Program at the East-West Center—a U.S.-based institution for public diplomacy in the Asia Pacific region, former Professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, former Faculty Member in the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval Postgraduate School, former Research Fellow with the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University in Canberra, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago, 2012 (“Why the U.S. shouldn't abandon Taiwan,” *Time*, December 6th, Available Online at http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/12/06/why-the-u-s-shouldnt-abandon-taiwan/, Accessed 06-28-2016)

There is no reason to expect that China would do more to further the American agenda on issues such as the North Korean and Iran nuclear weapons crises, since Chinese policy follows Chinese self-interests. Most importantly, Taiwan is not the source of China-U.S. friction. The two main Asia-Pacific powers are engaged in a rivalry for regional leadership and, even more fundamentally, in a struggle between two competing models for conducting international relations: one based on modern international laws and norms, and the other based on a return to the Sinocentric sphere of influence that prevailed for much of history. Rather than satisfying and pacifying Beijing, a U.S. concession regarding Taiwan might embolden Chinese demands for more concessions aimed at further weakening America’s strategic position in the Asia-Pacific region.

### Extend: “Plan Doesn’t Restore U.S.-China Relations”

#### This advantage only makes sense if Taiwan is China’s *only* regional aspiration.

Roy 15 — Denny Roy, Senior Fellow and Supervisor of the POSCO Fellowship Program at the East-West Center—a U.S.-based institution for public diplomacy in the Asia Pacific region, former Professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, former Faculty Member in the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval Postgraduate School, former Research Fellow with the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University in Canberra, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago, 2015 (“The Impossible Price of a U.S.-China Grand Bargain: Dumping Taiwan,” *The National Interest*, June 24th, Available Online at <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-impossible-price-us-china-grand-bargain-dumping-taiwan-13177?page=show>, Accessed 06-28-2016)

Glaser’s case has other weaknesses.

He assumes that the US abandonment of Taiwan would “dramatically improve” U.S.-China relations, and that “China can be very secure with the United States maintaining its alliances and forward deployment” as long as Taiwan is no longer in play. This is believable only if we posit that Beijing has no aspirations for regional leadership or revisions of the current order beyond gaining control over Taiwan, both now and in the future.

#### It’s *not* — China’s goal is to end American hegemony.

Jackson 15 — Van Jackson, Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, International Affairs Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Visiting Scholar and Adjunct Assistant Professor with the Asian Studies Program in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, former Strategist and Policy Adviser focused on the Asia-Pacific at the Office of the Secretary of Defense, holds a Ph.D. in World Politics from The Catholic University of America, 2015 (“The Myth of a US-China Grand Bargain,” *The Diplomat*, August 6th, Available Online at <http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/the-myth-of-a-us-china-grand-bargain/>, Accessed 06-28-2016)

China’s concerns will only be assuaged when the United States divests of the military force structure that makes it possible to project power globally, uphold its commitments, and bolster the regional order. The U.S. military will be unable to pursue such a course as long as China maintains openly expansionist geopolitical ambitions and a force structure designed to achieve it. Competition, it seems, is the logic of the situation. We ignore that at our own peril.

#### Their advantage relies on neofunctionalism. It’s a bankrupt theory: small concessions don’t “*spill up*” into better relations.

Jackson 15 — Van Jackson, Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, International Affairs Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Visiting Scholar and Adjunct Assistant Professor with the Asian Studies Program in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, former Strategist and Policy Adviser focused on the Asia-Pacific at the Office of the Secretary of Defense, holds a Ph.D. in World Politics from The Catholic University of America, 2015 (“The Myth of a US-China Grand Bargain,” *The Diplomat*, August 6th, Available Online at <http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/the-myth-of-a-us-china-grand-bargain/>, Accessed 06-28-2016)

Fourth, there’s a defunct theory that’s been smuggled into arguments about changing Chinese behavior through U.S. accommodation. Political scientists call it “neofunctionalism,” a term rarely used these days, even though its spirit is pervasive in grand bargain arguments. Neofunctionalism came about in the 1950s as a failed way to account for and push for European integration. The basic idea involved an assumption that low level and innocuous types of cooperation would “spillover” into still more and better quality cooperation. Comity among nations, it was thought, would be the eventual outcome of mundane socioeconomic interactions. But by the 1970s, the theory had become largely discredited.

Nevertheless, echoes of neofunctionalism remain in contemporary claims that properly calibrated restraint, accommodation, or appeasement can have a transformative effect on a relationship. Ironically, these arguments tend to come from scholars, not policymakers. The idea that the United States can induce China into resolving its East and South China Sea disputes by “giving” it Taiwan reflects precisely this type of expectation, as do calls for the United States to make small concessions to China in hopes that it will enable a more stable situation.

## Solvency Answers

### 1NC — Solvency

#### China Says *No* to the grand bargain:

#### 1. Bad Offer — China thinks they *already own* Taiwan.

Lingwall 15 — Noah Lingwall, Student at the Schreyer Honors College and Paterno Fellow majoring in History and Global & International Studies at the Pennsylvania State University, Intern at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, 2015 (“The Taiwan Problem: If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It,” *The Diplomat*, August 8th, Available Online at <http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/the-taiwan-problem-if-it-aint-broke-dont-fix-it/>, Accessed 06-30-2016)

Myth #2: Taiwan Can Serve as a Bargaining Chip

The effectiveness of a bargaining chip is predicated on whether or not the other party fears losing control of that bargaining chip. From China’s point of view, its claim over Taiwan is indisputable. So why would China make concessions over a bargaining chip it believes it already owns? China already has a powerful economic hold over Taiwan. In addition to economic interdependence, the past several years have also witnessed an increase in direct flights and sea transportation between the two nations. Businesspeople commonly make one-day trips across the Taiwan Strait. An effective unification is already well underway in the economic realm.

In addition, the Taiwanese prefer the status quo of de facto, but not de jure independence. Repeated opinion polls indicate that while more Taiwanese favor independence over unification, a majority of Taiwan’s people prefer to maintain the status quo.

Meanwhile, the threat of Chinese military force acts to dissuade Taiwan from attempting to break away from the mainland. As the Taiwanese gaze across the strait, they are greeted by a massive arsenal of 1,600 ground-to-ground missiles. Chinese anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) capabilities act as a potential deterrent to U.S. involvement in the event of an armed conflict between China and Taiwan. This military mismatch between the two sides serves as a potent deterrence to Taiwan attempting a hasty move for independence or even using the threat as a bargaining chip with the Chinese. China is also an increasing presence in Taiwan’s political system by mobilizing support for China-friendly politicians and making extensive donations to pro-China political actors. All in all, the notion of Taiwan as a “bargaining chip” fails to take into account China’s existing influence over Taiwan and complicates the possibility of a grand bargain.

#### 2. Bad Deal — China won’t agree to the “*accept U.S. presence*” condition.

Lingwall 15 — Noah Lingwall, Student at the Schreyer Honors College and Paterno Fellow majoring in History and Global & International Studies at the Pennsylvania State University, Intern at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, 2015 (“The Taiwan Problem: If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It,” *The Diplomat*, August 8th, Available Online at <http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/the-taiwan-problem-if-it-aint-broke-dont-fix-it/>, Accessed 06-30-2016)

Myth #3: A “Grand Bargain” Equals “Grand Concessions”

While a U.S.-China grand bargain is heralded as an ideal tactic to secure crucial U.S. interests, one must evaluate the feasibility of the United States’ demands. First, a grand bargain requires China to accept U.S. military bases and alliances in the Asia-Pacific. China’s recent move toward a more “assertive diplomacy” contrasts sharply with the United States’ ambitions to retain its regional power. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s call for a “new type of great power relations” presaged China’s turn toward greater assertiveness on the world stage. The proposal, presented to U.S. President Barack Obama in June 2013, represents China’s first major attempt to set the agenda in U.S.-China relations, reversing China’s historical trend of bowing to U.S. interests and marking a key shift in U.S.-China relations.

Tensions between the United States and China over China’s artificial island construction in the South China Sea indicate that China is loath to accept U.S. interference in the region. Throughout the past several months, U.S. surveillance planes and warships have patrolled the hotly contested South China Sea in an effort to protect freedom of navigation. Verbal exchanges between the two nations have stoked the conflict’s flames. U.S. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter responded to China’s territorial claims by calling for an “immediate and lasting halt to land reclamation by any claimant.” Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying responded by reasserting her nation’s rightful claim to disputed territories and condemning U.S. actions as “provocations and instigations.” Hua’s sharp rebuke of U.S. interference in the Asia-Pacific supports China’s commitment to more aggressive diplomacy. These types of interactions suggest that a U.S.-China “grand bargain” could falter on the basis of China’s distaste for U.S. hegemony.

#### 3. Impossible Condition — China *and other claimants* won’t agree on territorial dispute resolution.

Lingwall 15 — Noah Lingwall, Student at the Schreyer Honors College and Paterno Fellow majoring in History and Global & International Studies at the Pennsylvania State University, Intern at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, 2015 (“The Taiwan Problem: If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It,” *The Diplomat*, August 8th, Available Online at <http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/the-taiwan-problem-if-it-aint-broke-dont-fix-it/>, Accessed 06-30-2016)

The second condition of a U.S.-China “grand bargain” appears equally insurmountable. Charles Glaser asserts that China would promise to resolve regional land disputes through more peaceful means if the United States were to cede control of Taiwan. As is the case with acceptance of U.S. regional hegemony, this provision of the grand bargain would be difficult to enforce. China currently finds itself besieged by a litany of competing land claims from Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines, and other Asian nations. Based on China’s recent aggressive behavior in the South China Sea and President Xi Jinping’s “assertive diplomacy” manifesto, one can hardly expect that China will capitulate to its smaller, weaker neighbors. Doing so would both undermine its growing reputation as a maritime power and undercut its goal to become an established world power.

As China looks to enhance its international prestige, it is hard to believe that its leaders would tolerate the land claims of competing Asian nations. Also, it takes two parties to come to an agreement, so it is not up to China alone to guarantee the peaceful resolution of land disputes. The other disputants involved would have to make the same pledge to avoid territorial conflicts. Moreover, China’s rising national power may induce its leaders to initiate unpredictable, aggressive strategies in the future. The United States cannot orchestrate a grand bargain based on promised concessions.

### Glaser Indict

#### Prefer our evidence — Glaser’s not a China expert.

An 15 — David An, former U.S. diplomat who covered China, Taiwan, and East Asia in the State Department’s Political-Military Bureau between 2009 and 2014 where he helped coordinate several US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogues and worked out of the U.S. Embassy in Beijing and throughout East Asia, 2015 (“Glaser’s Simple Idea: Trade Taiwan for China,” *Ketagalan Media*, July 15th, Available Online at <http://www.ketagalanmedia.com/2015/07/15/glasers-simple-idea-trade-taiwan-china/>, Accessed 06-28-2016)

Second, Glaser is new to China and Taiwan issues. Having been a US-Russia nuclear expert, and Europe hand for most of his academic career, he has recently shifted his attention to Asia, and specifically China. His new yet controversial remarks come at a time when most lifelong East Asia scholars are calling for the opposite recommendation: to contain China rather than appease it. Andrew Browne’s Wall Street Journal article, “Can China be Contained?” published recently on June 12, 2015, draws from a range of China experts—Michael Pillsbury, former US deputy national security advisor Robert Blackwill, Ashley Tellis and Michael Swaine both of the Carnegie Endowment, Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, and many others—to advocate for “a policy of containment against China. The once solid Washington consensus behind the benefits of ‘constructive engagement’ with Beijing has fallen apart.”

#### Glaser relies on rational theory — it’s *inapplicable* and *ahistorical*.

An 15 — David An, former U.S. diplomat who covered China, Taiwan, and East Asia in the State Department’s Political-Military Bureau between 2009 and 2014 where he helped coordinate several US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogues and worked out of the U.S. Embassy in Beijing and throughout East Asia, 2015 (“Don’t Bargain Taiwan Away, America,” *Ketagalan Media*, July 21st, Available Online at http://www.ketagalanmedia.com/2015/07/21/dont-bargain-taiwan-away-america/, Accessed 06-28-2016)

I have previously argued that George Washington University Professor Charles Glaser’s rational theory has been misapplied to the case of Taiwan, and that the United States will do well to ignore Glaser’s call for a “grand bargain” with China, which requires the US to abandon Taiwan.

But even more importantly, Taiwan, or any state for that matter, is not simply a unitary actor subject to a set of predetermined laws of physics. Glaser’s rational theory, and the realist school of thought on which it is based, fails when it assumes away prior history, culture, and philosophy.

Rational theory can be irrational when it incorporates blind spots inherent in the realist tradition. Glaser calls himself a defensive realist. His theory draws from structural realism, which is a prevailing view within realism that the structure of the international system–meaning the distribution of material capabilities–forces great powers to behave cooperatively or competitively. As an academic approach, structural realism is ahistorical and state-centric. It does not focus on histories of states. It examines a state, not the individual, as the unit of analysis. With the state as the unit, the realist approach treats states as billiard balls that act and react against one another akin to Newtonian physics. These blind spots are severe.

#### Glaser’s theory is ahistorical — he doesn’t understand the China/Taiwan conflict.

An 15 — David An, former U.S. diplomat who covered China, Taiwan, and East Asia in the State Department’s Political-Military Bureau between 2009 and 2014 where he helped coordinate several US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogues and worked out of the U.S. Embassy in Beijing and throughout East Asia, 2015 (“Glaser’s Simple Idea: Trade Taiwan for China,” *Ketagalan Media*, July 15th, Available Online at <http://www.ketagalanmedia.com/2015/07/15/glasers-simple-idea-trade-taiwan-china/>, Accessed 06-28-2016)

Third, Glaser seems to use Taiwan as no more than a convenient rhetorical specimen for illustrating his theory, than a serious case study. Why just Taiwan? Rational theory’s logical implication of the US backing away from a single smaller partner to prevent conflict with that partner’s adversary is also analogous of Israel versus Arab states. Why didn’t Glaser make the bold claim that the US should abandon Israel, and thereby improve relations with the Arab states, based on the logic of his rational theory? I am not advocating for this course of action, but merely pointing out that such an idea is borderline taboo since it would be career suicide to pick a fight against Israel and its backers. His colleagues John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt caught much flak for examining what they concluded was an overly influential Israel lobby in the United States, far less than suggesting that the US break off support for Israel.

Instead, Glaser targets Taiwan.

In short, Glaser, himself not an expert in the intricate histories and personalities of the China and Taiwan conflict, tries to fit the case of Taiwan neatly into a theory that has traded applicability for elegance. American policymakers and academics should find that there is no need to think about giving up support for Taiwan, because doing so will incur grave implications in exchange for little to no benefit of possibly improving US-China relations.